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| | Abstract The US Iranian Relations After 11 September 2001
Das Abstract zum Referat von Özden Zeynep Oktav innerhalb der Einzelreferate Forums Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Block 4 (Donnerstag 10.45 - 12.45 Uhr, Raum Audimax XXII). Prior to September 11, the reasons for the United States to continue a policy of firmness towards Iran were as follows: Iran’s weapons programs, Iran’s opposition to Israel and the peace process, terrorism, Iran’s hegemonial ambitions in the Middle East, particularly toward Shi’ite Muslim populations.
President Mohammad Khatemi’s June 2001 re-election offered a number of opportunities for US policy towards Iran. It also provided an opportunity for the Bush administration to test the willingness of the new Iranian government to alter its foreign policy. In August 2001 however, the Congress extended ILSA for another five years. The renewal of the ILSA followed just weeks after Washington linked Tehran to a 1996 bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 US troops. Such developments appeared to set back any immediate prospects of US-Iranian relations improving after the re-election of moderate President Khatemi.
Nevertheless, Iranians’ expression of deep sympathy for the victims of September 11 was a real opportunity for improving relations. In addition, the Iranians, no less than the Americans, wanted the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and therefore it, at first, accepted a US military military presence in Afghanistan and other Central Asian states. However, Tehran has now become alarmed by US plans for longer term deployment in the region. The war in Iraq has changed the context of US-Iranian relations. By and large, Iranians considered themselves sorrounded by enemies (Iraq, Afghnistan, US forces in the Gulf), strategic competitors (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Azerbaijan), and unreliable partners (Russia and Armenia). This sense of isolation prompted Iran to seek advanced weaponry and nuclear technology.
The paper focuses mainly on the fact that the recent cycle of perceived potential and tacit disappointment has left both sides cynical vis-à-vis the possibility for constructive bilateral relations in the short and medium terms. In other words, the paper tries to explain the paradox in bilateral relations. While there has been some tacit cooperation between the US and Iran in agreeing to the ‘rules of the road’ in the Persian Gulf, the fragile relations stemming from the lack of confidence prompts the Bush administration to keep its policy of isolating Iran. This strengthens conservative Ayatollahs who regard the United States as an existential threat, and dashes the hopes for the integration of Iran into world.
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